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     The maritime impact on global migration is often overlooked despite the defining role 
of oceans on human mobility. Water surfaces initially posed barriers to migration, 
directing flows overland. Yet technological innovations turned rivers, lakes, and oceans 
into vehicles for all kinds of human interactions, including migration.1 Networks 
connecting hinterland and foreland converged in ports and spurred the exploration of new 
trade and migratory routes. They increased the connectedness between maritime and 
terrestrial life around small seas at first, then bridged the immensity of the Atlantic and 
Pacific Ocean from the fifteenth century. This marks the beginning of a new global era in 
which oceans no longer divided the world.2 The transatlantic triangular slave trade 
established the first long-distance maritime networks to transport human cargo on a large 
scale. In its wake, other forms of indentured and free migration movements developed 
across the oceans worldwide. By the 1850s, the stage was set for the age of global mass 
migration. Unprecedented mobility resulted from the combination of rising liberal 
regimes, steam-driven transport technology, and the demand for labor spurred by 
industrialization. Yet the high density of the flow as well as the growing ethnic diversity 
drove the major receiving countries to question the benefits of unrestricted mobility. This 
age of high imperialism and accelerated globalization offered a fertile ground for 
nationalism and eugenics. The global, cross-border interactions that characterized this era 
also contributed to the creation and consolidation of nation-state borders in which 
migration control played a central role. The function of the sea as a barrier was reinstalled, 
in particular as states integrated private shipping companies as key actors in their efforts to 
develop state controls on human mobility.  
     This paradox of turning carriers into barriers of migration in the United States is the 
central topic of this article.3 The narrative shows how states tightened their maritime 
frontier zones and to what extent these influenced the consolidation of land borders, 
installing a control system based on exclusion that spread globally. The rise of the modern 
borders, here defined as lines delimiting political units, was more than a fragmentation of 
the world into nation-states. As Aristide Zolberg put it, the system also served to 
consolidate a world order, as it set "the first stones of a global wall erected by the rich 
industrial states to protect themselves from the 'invasion' by the world's poor."4 Through 
world-system analysis, growing attention has been focused on frontier zones, where two 
different systems meet: frontiers are considered as areas of interaction and overlap, in 
contrast to the border's function of differentiating places.5 Currently, in particular since the 
Fence Act (2006), the most iconic expression of such a frontier is the Mexican-American 
 
border, where the high-tech control system cost more than the total GDP of Burkina Faso 
in 2012. 
     This article analyzes the maritime origins of this global wall, from 1880 to 1920, 
through the eyes of the shipping companies that played a first-hand role in enacting, 
enforcing and evading these borders. The business perspective on border development 
gives a fresh look at the interplay of nationalism and globalization, while at the same time 
highlighting regional and local differences. Scholars have emphasized that laws excluding 
the Chinese from white-settler nations developed a legal rationale for barring the entry of 
certain groups, as well as the basic principles of border control and the administrative 
organization to execute these. For the U.S., it is claimed that that rhetoric and tools 
developed to exclude Asians were later copied to greatly restrict the entry of Southern and 
Eastern Europeans and subsequently mass migration as a whole.6 Adam McKeown thus 
concluded that standardized templates of migration control had diffused globally by 1910.7 
Yet few studies have analyzed these transfers explicitly, while most research on migration 
to the U.S. is based on congressional sources that are restricted to a top-down perspective. 
Some recent studies, by using the case files of detained and deported migrants, provide a 
new, micro perspective, highlighting the gap between enacting and enforcing migration 
laws.8 This micro-perspective polarizes the history of rising modern barriers on human 
mobility, turning it into a two-sided battle between the migrant and the state. 
     This study shows that other actors—especially passenger transport companies—
interposed themselves in determining the flows of migrants. For the North Atlantic, 
several recent studies point to the role of steam shipping companies in establishing the 
U.S. maritime frontier, serving as go-betweens for migrants and the state.9 This article 
extends these studies by exploring the connections, similarities, and differences between 
Atlantic and Pacific maritime frontiers of the U.S., along with their terrestrial 
ramifications. It deconstructs the notion of a U.S. border regime rooted in excluding 
Chinese and then expanding to obstruct the influx of other ethnic groups. Instead, this 
article argues that two different U.S. border regimes took shape simultaneously on the 
Atlantic and the Pacific: I thus question the existence of a U.S. national border-control 
system in the years before 1920.  
Enacting the 'nationalization' of U.S. migration legislation: Atlantic versus 
Pacific 
The business perspective on migration policies of the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries permits reassessment of narrow, nation-based historiographies. Migration 
history, initially studied in major receiving countries, focused on policies of admission, 
integration, and assimilation from a top-down, state-based perspective. Subsequent studies 
started to integrate the agency of the migrants: they showed how migrants moved across 
porous borders. This approach reversed the initial distortion in the paradigm: it drew 
attention to the countries of departure, as their policies influenced the travel and settlement 
of migrants, and their ties to the home country. This revised paradigm allowed for the 
integration of emigration and immigration into an interconnected process, enhancing our 
understanding of transnational spaces in which individuals move and of the international 
relations which shape state policies.  
     Still, complementing immigration with an emigration perspective fails to grasp the full 
scope of migration polices, in that the role of transit countries remains discounted.10 Thus, 
many thousands of migrants left Russia, Austria-Hungary or Scandinavia and then sailed 
from Germany or England to the U.S. As Donna Gabaccia argues, migration policies may 
be better debated from a global rather than a domestic perspective.11 This observation 
reveals that, during the long nineteenth century, many authorities were more interested in 
regulating and attracting the business of transporting migrants than they were concerned 
about who entered or left their boundaries. For a long time, migration policies remained 
subordinate to trade and maritime polices. The growing significance of trade and maritime 
policies influenced the dynamics through which the modern global border system took 
shape—dynamics in which the shipping companies claimed a key but overlooked role.  
     To exemplify this point we can refer to what became known as remote border-control 
policies. This refers to the principle that states seek to push migrant controls back from 
their own terrestrial borders as far as possible and preferably to the home country, before a 
person choses to migrate.12 Aristide Zolberg emphasized that the first American Passenger 
Act (1819) pioneered the principle of selecting migrants before they left Europe rather 
than on arrival in the United States. Concretely, policymakers believed that imposing 
bigger space requirements for migrants on shipowners would increase the cost of 
transportation and reduce the arrivals of the poorest class. This hope proved illusory 
because, with the developing patterns of "chain migration," the cost of relocation was not 
necessarily borne by the individual migrant but often by family and friends who had 
moved previously. Moreover, as the migrant developed into a lucrative commodity on the 
North Atlantic, the competitive pressures for the migrant trade quickly cancelled out any 
restrictive effects of the Passenger Act. By the time the act came up for revision in 1840s, 
the European mass-migration movement was booming. To help American shipowners 
claim a dominant position in the lucrative market, the revised Passenger Act allowed 
American sailing ships to build a third deck, hence increasing their capacity. As with its 
pioneering predecessor, the British Passenger Act (1803), the main concern of the 
American Passenger Act was not the regulation of who left or arrived, nor in what 
conditions the migrants travelled. Instead, the act was to protect national shipping interests 
against foreign competition. By the mid-1850s, two thirds of the European migrants were 
brought in on American boats.13 
     The abolition of slave trade had reconfigured the triangular patterns of transatlantic 
trade into two-directional ones, bringing timber, grain, cotton and tobacco from the U.S. 
There was little cargo to ship back to America from Europe until the mass migration 
movement developed. Migrants maximized profits and strengthened shipowners' position 
on the market for American goods: shipowners were now able, to quote lower prices for 
American goods than ships arriving without passengers. This triggered a keen competition 
among shipowners, ports, and government authorities, all seeking to lure migrants. In the 
1830s, the Bremen Hanseatic authorities successfully pioneered legislation directing 
migrants to certain routes and ships, rather than checking who left or entered.14 Similar 
legislation spread quickly to Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, bringing a 
defining impact on transatlantic migrant routes. The Belgian case underlines the 
geopolitical interest in the trade. To consolidate the recently obtained political 
independence (1830), rulers sought to promote Belgium as a nodal point for international 
commerce. Through these trade relations, the young nation wanted to create goodwill from 
states to defend its independence against any challenges. They negotiated trade agreements 
and spurred the development of maritime networks, especially on the North Atlantic. Ties 
with the United States and the German states were judged essential to fight off the Dutch, 
then considered as the "natural rival." Authorities invested in infrastructure, in particular in 
rail and waterways improving the connections with the hinterland. They negotiated 
reduced fares for Swiss and German migrants to reach Antwerp. Consuls advertised the 
port as "the emigration gateway to the New World," where laws and special officials 
protected the migrants on their inland and overseas journey. The government also 
subsidized the first transatlantic steam shipping line from continental Europe to the U.S.15 
     In most European countries the only restrictions limiting emigration by citizens 
concerned the fulfillment of military duties for men. Aliens in transit to overseas 
destinations could travel freely after passing minor controls on health and financial means. 
The free movement of people was closely tied to the liberalization of trade and the ideas of 
reciprocity. Up to World War I, migration policies in Europe became steadily more linked 
to maritime polices: legislation directed migrants to national ports and national shipping 
companies, for economic but also military purposes. Ships flying under the national flag 
could be used for naval purposes if conflicts arose. For instance, when in 1894 the German 
Reichstag established eastern border control stations to check transatlantic migrants, the 
government entrusted management of the stations to German steamship companies. The 
German companies thus gained a powerful tool in directing the emerging eastern European 
migratory movement to their ships instead of foreign lines. The initial drafts of the 
German emigration law banned all foreign shipping lines from selling steamship tickets to 
German migrants on German territory. Under diplomatic pressures, the 1897 law 
eventually limited the exclusion to Dutch companies.16 However, the German shipping 
lines saw these policies backfire when other countries adopted them. The case of Italy was 
very clear. Within eight years of adopting its 1901 Emigration Law, Italy's shipping 
companies on the North Atlantic rose from one to five, relying largely on Italian-built 
ships. The proportion of Italians migrating aboard ships flying the national flag nearly 
tripled, from 18% to 51%. This experience underlines the effectiveness of using the 
migration stream to develop the national merchant marine.17 It also shows that adopting 
national policies to regulate human mobility had become generally accepted when global 
migration peaked. 
     In the United States, however, migration and maritime policies became dissociated 
during the 1850s, not least due to a problematic transition from sail to steam shipping. 
Congress initially subsidized various transatlantic steamship lines as part of the familiar 
policies to retain a dominant position on the passenger market. Yet it lost this 
technological battle of national prestige to Great Britain, allowing the latter to acquire a 
dominant position on the migrant trade. The Civil War brought decline of the American 
merchant marine. Authorities turned to protectionist maritime policies, defending 
shipbuilders over shipowners and coastal shipping over long distance maritime routes—
thus withdrawing into continental isolation. Congress did not expand the navy, and neither 
did it associate its military needs to the developments of the merchant marine. As the 
major receiving country, the U.S. had a privileged position from which to steer the 
immigrant flow to the benefit of its merchant fleet, but the American Congress never did 
so. Regulations to advantage American ships, such as charging an extra $50 head tax to 
immigrants arriving on foreign ships, were never seriously considered. By the 1880s, the 
share of the once-dominant American merchant marine on the North Atlantic had fallen to 
16%. Not even the Spanish-American war, which laid bare the weakness of U.S. imperial 
pretensions, convinced Congress to build a strong fleet.18 
     Let us turn now, in this study of American maritime and migration policies, from the 
main Atlantic route to the Pacific. The trans-Pacific migration route opened much later and 
began to expand just as the American merchant marine entered its Atlantic decline. 
American authorities turned to the Pacific to give their last significant pre-World War I 
appropriation to long-distance shipping. The subsidies given to the Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company (PMSS) allowed the first transpacific steamship line to be opened under the 
stars and stripes in the 1860s. Both trade and migration prospects were promising, as 
China was forced to relax restrictions on the movement of goods and people. Pacific 
competition was nearly inexistent, as compared to the Atlantic, where, by the 1870s, 
seventeen steam shipping companies operated 173 vessels in battling for a share of the 
market. The PMSS had only to reckon with the Oriental and Occidental Steamship 
Company (OOSC), also American. Each shipping initiative was connected to powerful 
railroads and operated a dozen ships. However the disassociation of maritime and 
migration policies by American authorities quickly compromised the growth of both lines. 
Just as on the Atlantic, steamship companies drew most revenues from third-class migrant 
transport, followed by cabin class transport, goods and mail. Yet by the mid-1870s the 
government restricted the Pacific migration movement by prohibiting the entry of 
(Chinese) prostitutes, convicts, and coolies with the Page Act. This restriction expanded 
strongly with the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. The companies managed to remain 
afloat because of the exceptions allowing travel for merchants, diplomats, and students; in 
addition they benefited from patterns of return migration, repeat migration, and illegal 
migration. But the exclusion jeopardized any prospects for growth.19 
     These laws marked a turning point in both American and global migration policies, as 
migration would increasingly be considered as a matter of national sovereignty. 
Previously, policymakers had showed reluctance to take unilateral decisions considering 
migration. They believed migration to depend on international trade agreements, fearing 
that restrictions on human mobility would obstruct the trade in goods. For the Pacific, 
diplomats carefully renegotiated the Burlingame Treaty with China before passing the 
Exclusion Act. This treaty generated the dual policy of keeping an open door for 
transpacific trade while closing it for migrants, with exceptions. On the Atlantic the gates 
remained open for both migrants and commodities, even though Congress passed an 1882 
general immigration law directed at controlling transatlantic flows. It was open to all 
migrants, with the exclusion of idiots, convicts, and people likely to become a public 
charge; contract laborers were added to this list in 1884.20 When Belgian authorities 
sought allies to protest against this act for infringing trade agreements, it found no support. 
Officials of contacted nations declined to protest, stating that it was a nation's own right to 
decide who it let in or not.21 As President Grover Cleveland put it in his State of the Union 
address, years later: "The right to exclude any or all classes of aliens is an attribute of 
sovereignty. It is a right asserted and, to a limited extent, enforced by the United States, 
with the sanction of our highest court."22 By then this notion was generally accepted 
among nations. 
     The dichotomy between the Atlantic and Pacific immigration policies has been 
attributed to the bigger racial differences of the Pacific newcomers, generating stronger 
nativist pressures in the West. Conversely, in the East, the industrialists' power to oppose 
restrictions among immigrants was more effective. Amid these large firms, shipping 
companies had the most direct interests at stake and took up a leading role to advocate 
liberal migration policies. Several authors have argued that shipping interests influenced 
the American Passenger Acts, regulating how people moved from the beginnings up to 
their reviews in the 1850s, 1882 and 1907.23 The shipping interests weakened the 
implementation of the existing measures by playing out the rivalry among Atlantic 
American ports to attract passenger traffic. Until New York established itself as the nodal 
American port for transatlantic travel, this strategy proved successful. In the meantime, to 
prevent restrictive measures from being passed, shipping interests stalled the adoption of 
new unilateral regulations by stressing the need for international agreements. Foreign 
diplomats, in particular German and British supporters of big shipping interests, made sure 
that negotiations lingered and that the eventual 1882 Passenger Act resembled existing 
European laws.  
     With the shift to the "nationalization" of migration policies, however, shipping interests 
realized that the "international trade" argument no longer stood. General immigration laws 
now posed the biggest threat to their business. The arguments used against restrictions 
shifted to a national rhetoric, underlining the benefits of migration for the United States. 
But such a message was undermined if expressed by an interest group consisting mainly of 
foreign interests that gained financially from unrestricted migration. The shipping interests 
turned to major railroad companies and industrialists to support the campaigns, 
concentrating at first on Capitol Hill. Their main goal was to retain a status quo, favoring 
the least possible regulation. Lobbyists kept shipping lines posted on the debates, created 
goodwill among congressmen, and used various strategies to prevent actions on 
immigration bills. If adoption of immigration acts proved unavoidable, they provided 
amendments to weaken the acts.24 
     The only recognizable interest groups opposing the shipping lobby on the Atlantic were 
labor unions. The labor unions were initially divided on the immigration issue but, by the 
mid-1890s, all unions endorsed restrictions and were joined by a rapidly growing nativist 
movement. The nativists, who formed the Immigration Restriction League (IRL), gained 
momentum as migration from new Eastern and Southern European regions overtook the 
traditional influx from Northern and Western Europe. The IRL advocated a literacy test to 
curb the new stream, while leaving the literate 'old-stock' flow undisturbed. If adopted, this 
restriction threatened to reduce the traffic by thirty percent.  
     The shipping companies responded by closing their ranks and redoubling their lobbying 
efforts. With the transition from sail to steam during the 1860s, the previously 
fragmentized business had become concentrated in the hands of a limited number of multi-
national shipping companies. By the 1880s, the North Atlantic shipping companies had 
assembled into three major shipping cartels: the British-Scandinavian, Continental, and 
Mediterranean shipping conferences. The cartels stimulated cooperation among the 
companies, improving the effectiveness of their lobbying campaigns. Their top-down 
lobbying efforts in Washington intensified and were complemented with bottom-up 
campaigns to influence public opinion. Shipping companies hired journalists and 
academics to screen the press and scientific journals, countering restrictionist stances with 
liberal arguments. They built strong ties with the press, especially the foreign-language 
papers, through advertising and because some newspaper owners sold ocean passage 
tickets.25 
     As the economic crisis of the mid-1890s led American employers to reduce their 
support of pro-immigration campaigns, the shipping lobby turned to organizing migrant 
groups to voice their claims. They funded and established ethnic and cross-ethnic 
associations representing immigrant communities. In the growing trust-busting climate, 
these associations gave the shipping companies a much-needed mouthpiece. The well-
established ties of the shipping companies with the "old-stock" immigrant communities 
helps to explain why the Irish and German communities initially obstructed the literacy 
test. Although these ethnic groups would hardly be affected by these measures, the 
shipping lines needed their political leverage, which newer immigrant communities could 
not yet match.26 Immigrant communities that organized mass meetings were much more 
visible to politicians and in the public eye than were the elitist restrictive interest groups. 
The ethnic associations also became increasingly important for top-down lobbying 
strategies in Washington, with their efforts coordinated by the shipping companies. The 
impact of these lobbying campaigns is hard to measure, yet it is a fact that a literacy test 
for immigrants passed one of the houses of Congress seventeen times and endured four 
presidential vetoes between 1896 and 1917 before being enacted. The outbreak of World 
War, however, totally disrupted the shipping lobby and destabilized the immigrant 
communities, while patriotic nationalistic sentiments gave nativists wings.27 
     For enactment of the Atlantic migration regime, shipping interests played an 
undeniable role. For the Pacific, the absence of a similar lobbying power accentuated the 
gap between the immigration regimes of the two oceanic basins. This is not to say that the 
two American lines, OOSC and especially PMSS, lacked all influence on Capitol Hill. 
That the PMSS knew the ropes for influencing congressmen was illustrated by a mid-
1870s corruption scandal about their state subsidies.28 How much this scandal weakened 
the PMSS lobbying efforts against Chinese exclusion remains to be explored. There is no 
indication that PMSS had close ties with the much more significant Atlantic shipping 
lobby, dominated by European companies. Pacific shipping interests, although based in the 
U.S. and supported by big railroad corporations, had to contend with nativist groups of a 
strength that was not to develop until later on the Atlantic. In addition, the Pacific 
corporate interests lacked the leverage of established migrant communities. Chinese 
immigrants, excluded from naturalized citizenship until 1870, were only a fraction of the 
numbers of European migrant groups who contested restrictions. Finally, the reciprocity of 
U.S. trade and diplomatic relations with European countries, for which there was no real 
equivalent in the Pacific, contributed to the divergence.  
     During this period of accelerated globalization, the U.S. did not stand alone in adopting 
national migration policies rooted in racial and ethnic prejudices. Adam McKeown 
brilliantly described how the U.S. influenced and shared policies of other white-settler 
nations to exclude Asians.29 Other studies have noted connections of American and 
European immigration policies. For instance, the British Alien Act (1905) and the German 
migration policies regarding Poles and Chinese highlight this interplay. These studies 
underline that the "nationalization" of the migration policies came not only from within 
the U.S. but was shaped by polices of other nations and by actual and possible global 
migration patterns.30 These macro-level studies, however, are mainly based on a top-down 
state perspective showing how the exclusionary rhetoric spread through the enactment of 
laws. The micro-level studies comparing how these were interpreted and enforced in local 
border control stations are yet to be completed.  
     Attention to the shipping lobby underscores that third parties played an important role 
in construing policy debates and influencing legislation. Dorothee Schneider noted that the 
shipping lines also played an equally important role in enforcement. European states 
gladly delegated de facto border control to transport companies and their agents, forcing 
migrants to negotiate their exit with them up to the 1930s.31 During this period, nation-
states still in process of bureaucratization relied greatly on third parties to implement their 
policies. What Schneider labeled as "commercialization of border control," for exit, also 
applies to policies of entry. By focusing on this role of shipping lines in U.S. border 
enforcement, it will now be argued: 1) that during the "nationalization" process of 
migration policies, the polarization between Atlantic and Pacific regimes intensified rather 
than diminished; 2) that the exclusion of Europeans through Quota Acts was much more a 
consequence of the Atlantic regime than of the Pacific; and 3) that the unification of the 
two regimes that did occur was two-directional. The focus on border enforcement also 
stresses the much-neglected importance of the local within migration policies. Immigrant 
control stations operated as isolated dots before being connected into a borderline (and 
later a full blown fence), but always retained their specificities.  
Enforcing migration policies and border control regimes 
The maritime origins of most nineteenth-century U.S. immigration facilitated the 
concentration of American border enforcement at key ports. New York and San Francisco 
attracted ninety per cent of the registered transatlantic and transpacific immigrants 
respectively. These became the laboratory of new enforcement measures that gradually 
spread to other maritime ports of entry and terrestrial border-control stations. Yet the gap 
between Pacific and Atlantic border regimes was reinforced from the start not only 
because of diverging laws but also because the control stations were entrusted to two 
different institutions. For both coasts, the laws of 1882 underline how little consideration 
policymakers gave to the enforcement of their laws. On the Pacific side, the Chinese 
Exclusion Act was entrusted, without guidelines, to specialized customs officials who 
formed the Chinese Bureau and worked closely with port authorities and health officials. 
Previous measures such as the Page Act had been entrusted with carte blanche to the 
Hong Kong consuls. This remote-border-control principle of stopping undesirables before 
the ship voyage was a long-pursued ideal that encountered many practical impossibilities. 
The main problem was that these controls undermined the authority of custom inspectors 
at the gates to reject a migrant who previously had been approved by the consul. The 
difficulties arising from the initial experiments with remote border control pushed the 
American authorities to prioritize the enforcement at its own terrestrial borders.32 On the 
Atlantic side, Congress took even less responsibility for the implementation of the general 
immigration laws, leaving enforcement to state-government initiatives already in place. 
Only in 1891, after mounting denunciations of irregularities and lack of uniformity, did 
Congress create a federal administration to implement the laws in main Atlantic ports. The 
Immigration Bureau was headed by a commissioner general in Washington, who was to 
supervise commissioners of immigration in charge of control stations staffed with civil 
servants. Pacific control stations remained under the Bureau of Customs and only came 
under the full purview of the Immigration Bureau in 1903. Only then were the general 
exclusion laws extended to apply as well to the Chinese, to whom the special exclusion 
acts and inspection regime still applied. The local administration of the laws on Chinese 
and other aliens remained bifurcated until 1909.33 This created a dual administration of 
immigration laws, with little apparent exchange of the methods used among control 
stations. The annual reports of the commissioner general of immigration make clear that 
Chinese and later Japanese immigration continued to be treated totally separately, with 
different regimes of administration persisting well beyond the period under consideration.  
 
  
 
 
  
  
HOW JOHN MAY DODGE THE EXCLUSION ACT. 
A Chinese migrant is kicked off the dock by Uncle Sam, but accompanying 
vignettes and text show how Chinese might enter the United States illegally. 
This was linked to the entry of undesirable European immigrants: "As an 
industrious anarchist for example. Or disguised as an humble Irishman. Let 
him come as an English wife-hunter. If not these, let him come to us as a 
cup-challenger [in yacht racing]. Or a peaceful, law-abiding Sicilian." 
Source: John S. Pughe (artist) in Puck (July 12, 1905). Courtesy U.S. Library 
of Congress. 
  
 
     For inspectors at the gates, enforcement was a learning-by-doing process. The laws 
gave them a lot of margin for interpretation and for introducing new measures. For 
instance, concepts such as "likely to become a public charge" (LPC) or "merchants" 
remained undefined by law, leaving categorizing these to inspectors. Commissioners of 
immigration liked this leverage, as Joseph Senner (New York, 1893-1897) observed for 
the LPC-clause, as it allowed inspectors to reject migrants they deemed undesirable 
without requiring too much evidence.34 This ambiguity, however, reinforced the 
differences among immigrant control stations. On the Atlantic, New York was known for 
its stricter implementation of the laws as compared to the secondary ports of Baltimore, 
Boston or Philadelphia. This knowledge circulated through shipping companies, migrant 
agents, and migrant letters, who directed those passengers already rejected or running the 
risk of exclusion to the secondary ports. For shipping companies, this distinction was even 
used as one of the business arguments to open a line to such secondary ports.35 On the 
Pacific, San Francisco had a reputation similar to that of New York. Seattle was the only 
port to have a direct shipping line for a period, whereas other ports such as Los Angeles 
and Portland received occasional ships or indirect traffic. Some individual immigrants 
were consciously guided by migrant agents to secondary ports for the more lenient 
inspections. Sometimes this was organized on a larger scale for certain groups that showed 
higher risks to be deported, as for instance the migration of Syro-Lebanese through 
Philadelphia.36 
     With the imposition of legal barriers, the federal authorities were instantly faced with 
illegal migration. This problem was reinforced by ever-increasing transport efficiency, 
which heightened the fluidity of boundaries, drastically reducing the time and cost of 
smuggling. Meanwhile, the U.S. federal government, by battling smuggling activities, 
greatly extended its policing powers at home and abroad. According to Peter Andreas, 
illicit flows of goods and people, together with the campaigns to police them, shape and 
define the nation. In this view, the state creates smuggling, but in turn smuggling remakes 
the state.37 The present study, while adopting Andreas's approach, argues in addition that 
the state does not necessarily pursue uniform policies. The exchanges and connections that 
linked the divergent Pacific and Atlantic migration-control regimes appeared most visibly, 
however, in the course of fighting illicit migrant entry. Early enforcement in the U.S. was 
facilitated by the fact that nearly all immigration targeted by the laws had to cross major 
oceans. Nevertheless, the U.S. could not prevent ships from disembarking, in neighboring 
countries, passengers who sought to cross into American territory. Conversely, the 
enforcement system created business opportunities that stimulated the opening of shipping 
lines. The Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR) opened a steamship service from Vancouver 
to Hong Kong in 1887. That the Canadian government also introduced obstacles for the 
landing of Chinese laborers did not impede the line's success: an important part of its 
clientele used the service as a back door enabling immigration to the U.S.38 
     The press denounced American port inspections as void if they were not enforced at the 
land borders. Eastern papers reported that Irish and Germans of the lowest classes abused 
the Canadian back door, criticisms which were echoed about Chinese in the West. In 
theory, customs officials were supposed to check for undesirable migrants; in practice they 
only checked luggage for contraband.39 The sheer volume of European immigration, 
greatly exceeding that of Chinese, made the problem more pressing on the Atlantic than 
the Pacific. A small percentage of excluded migrants still represented an important flow, 
as compared to the Pacific. Between 1853 and 1914 the registered migrant traffic from the 
Pacific totaled 600,000 (60% Chinese, 30% Japanese, 10% other), which amounted to a 
little over 2% of the 26,000,000 registered Atlantic migrants.40 Moreover, there were many 
more established shipping lines connecting Canada to Europe, facilitating indirect entry to 
the U.S. Passenger shipping companies calling at Canadian ports were already competing 
for a share of the American migrant market. Among shipping companies, the Beaver Line 
was reputed to specialize in illegals, until it was taken over by the CPR in 1903. From this 
point the CPR became the first and only company to be active in both oceans.41 
     Faced with the immensity of the 4000-mile-long U.S.-Canadian border (not counting 
Alaska), U.S. authorities took more than a decade to start remedying illegal migration 
through the commercialization of border control and border diplomacy. The diplomacy 
entailed imposing American laws on Canadian authorities, for instance by imposing U.S. 
laws at Canadian ports of entry. Just as in the U.S., transport companies such as the CPR 
led the lobbying campaigns to prevent Canadian immigration restrictions. They were 
therefore ill-disposed to allowing American authorities to impose new restrictions. 
Nevertheless, to avoid compromising the cross-border rail traffic of Canadian laborers, 
CPR was forced into some concessions. In 1901, Canadian authorities granted American 
inspectors the right to check all passengers who listed the U.S. as their final destination 
when they arrived in Canada. Those who did not list a U.S. destination could easily bypass 
the measure. The Immigration Bureau tried to standardize inspections at main terrestrial 
cross-border points. Still, every measure of the unwieldy administration was easily 
bypassed by the flexible smuggling networks whose organization and business grew as the 
barriers on migration at the gates became harsher. Border diplomacy bore some fruits, as 
the Canadian Parliament copied certain American laws to avoid getting stuck with U.S. 
rejects. Canada's efforts, however, centered more on stimulating immigration rather than 
monitoring it, as laws remained less restrictive and more leniently enforced: success of this 
policy brought dismay to U.S. officials. For instance, despite the prohibitive Canadian 
head-taxes of 500 dollars for Chinese laborers, three times as many registered Chinese 
migrants arrived in Canada as arrived in the U.S. between 1908 and 1914. Some made 
their way south, as did European illegals who drove smuggling activities to new heights 
after the introduction of the U.S. Quota Acts during the 1920s. The Canadian Chinese 
Exclusion Act (1923) trailed the U.S. version by more than four decades, confirming the 
mixed success of border diplomacy.42 Only the global economic crisis of the 1930s 
eventually forced Canada to become fully integrated into the global wall that created 
frontier zones between the industrialized nations and the peripheries.  
     The mechanisms that came to consolidate present-day policies in one of today's most 
contested frontier zones, the U.S. southern border, were also pioneered to counter 
transpacific and transatlantic illegal migrants. This system arose during the Porfiriato 
(1876-1911), the political regime which took Mexico out of commercial isolation, opening 
up new transatlantic and transpacific steamship connections. Through passenger transport 
lines, authorities encouraged labor migration to spur new industries. Apart from minor 
health checks, no immigration restrictions existed. Further, mistrust towards the northern 
neighbour prevented the appointment of U.S. inspectors at Mexican ports. As part of the 
periphery, Mexico did not buy into U.S. border diplomacy and became attractive to 
smuggling networks, in parallel to Canada. The same went for Cuba, which also 
functioned as an important hub in this southern back door. The Gulf and the nearly 2000-
mile-long land border provided plenty of opportunities. Staffed with just over a hundred 
inspectors, isolated immigrant border control stations at nodal transport points remained 
powerless. The founding of the Border Patrol (1924) changed little, and by that time 
Mexican journeymen had started substituting for transoceanic migrant labourers.43 The 
results led gradually to today's militarization of the southern U.S. border and the 
portraying of illegal immigration as one of the main threats undermining the favoured U.S. 
position in the word-system. The language used in the rhetoric suggests that the core 
countries are presently engaged in a war to neutralize the porousness of the global frontier 
with the peripheries.  
     The contrast of the U.S. southern and northern borders cannot be more sharply 
illustrated than by the "Peace Arch Border Crossing" monument joining Washington State 
to British Columbia. It carries the inscriptions "Children of a common mother," "Brethren 
dwelling together in unity," and "May these gates never be closed. " At the time of its 
construction in 1921, however, smuggling networks converged at both the northern and 
southern land borders, bringing transatlantic and transpacific migrants into the U.S. Little 
is yet known on the history of the local border control stations and how they dealt with 
enforcing laws stemming from two different immigration regimes. Research on local 
stations should also shed more light on the extent to which they operated as isolated dots 
or were connected with other stations to form a borderline, as generally perceived. The re-
opening of Ellis Island and Angel Island as museums has drawn new attention to the 
maritime origins of migration enforcement practices at these main ports of entry. The 
exhibits lack explicit comparisons but highlight the different methods: the Pacific system 
of exclusion with exceptions vs. the Atlantic system of inclusion with exceptions. The 
distinctions were dictated especially by differences in the volume of immigration. New 
York welcomed major passenger steamers daily, whereas for San Francisco the arrival of 
such vessels was occasional. During the record year of 1907, 2700 immigrants were 
processed daily at Ellis Island, a number which exceeds the average annual admittance of 
all Chinese between 1883 and 1917. To avoid congestion, the screening of migrants in 
New York was superficial, withholding only a small percentage for further investigation. 
Conversely most Chinese underwent thorough interrogations and cross-examination with 
witnesses.44 
     On the east coast, the only papers identifying the entering migrants were the passenger 
manifests provided by the shipping lines, until 1914. On the west coast, various sorts of 
certificates and documents, often photographed, were required. Such papers were to 
establish the eligibility to enter and also the right to stay with the introduction of 
certificates of residence. Medical inspections varied with ethnic groups and the distinctive 
diseases they were assumed to carry: inspections of Chinese were commonly exhaustive. 
When speaking in generalizing terms about the Pacific and especially for the Atlantic it 
should always be borne in mind that race and gender played a crucial differentiating role. 
Women in general and people from eastern and southern Europe were scrutinized more 
thoroughly. How much racial prejudices played a role depended a lot on the person in 
charge of the immigration control station. When the puritan William Williams managed 
Ellis Island, his disdain for the "racially inferior" was reflected in increased detentions and 
deportations, in particular for eastern and southern Europeans. Williams imposed new 
measures including financial tests and health tests, putting great effort into rationalizing 
and standardizing controls. While he marked the organization of Ellis Island, it remains 
unclear to what extent his influence reached other border stations. Similar impact of key 
administrators, notably John Wise and James Dunn, has also been denoted for the Pacific. 
One difference was that, because of racial prejudice, no Chinese-American would ever 
direct a control station, whereas first- or second-generation European immigrants, such as 
Austrian-born Joseph Senner (1893-1897) or English-born Robert Watchorn (1905-1909) 
led Ellis Island with more lenient views.45 Williams' rationalizing efforts were supported 
by his superiors, Commissioners General of Immigration such as Terence Powderly and 
Frank Sargent, who centralized information, standardized categories and systemized 
examinations at the ports. These were increasingly racialized and reliant on eugenic 
beliefs. Due to the personal impact of those in charge of control stations and other key 
functions in the immigration administration, the shipping lines lobbied with divided 
success for the appointment of moderates at these positions.46  
     Besides standardizing their own bureaucracy, government officials expanded the 
responsibility of the shipping companies for bringing over undesirables. This strategy of 
incorporating transport companies to compensate for the shortcomings of the bureaucratic 
apparatus had been common practice from the start. The extent to which shipping lines 
were an integrated part of border enforcement is symbolized by the fact that, until the 
inauguration of Angel Island (1910), all detained migrants to San Francisco were first held 
on PMSS ships and later in a warehouse of the company.47 A good working relationship 
benefited both parties, as the shipping lines tried to create mutual goodwill to land as many 
passengers as possible, while the immigration authorities depended on the lines to operate. 
Border officials relied on the shipping lines both to spread and obtain information. Their 
dependence on passenger manifests to acquire information on passengers has already been 
pointed out. The Immigration Bureau used the shipping lines to have the immigration laws 
posted in all offices of migrant agents in Europe and the U.S. Changes in the 
implementation of the laws moved along the same networks, as did ways to circumvent 
inspections. The head-tax, which was levied per immigrant and used to fund the 
immigration administration, was collected through the shipping lines. The companies 
lobbied to keep head-taxes as low as possible, to limit the expansion of border 
enforcement, but could not prevent rises with the passage of every new general 
immigration law (1893 $1, 1903 $2, 1907 $4, 1917 $8).48  
     Authorities increased the involvement of shipping lines in particular by increasing their 
financial responsibilities. Shipping companies risked fines of $100 for failing to present 
third-class passengers for inspection. Fines of $10 were introduced for grave mistakes on 
the passenger manifest. This improved the accuracy of the documents. This strategy was 
employed especially to penalize companies for bringing over undesirables. In 1882, the 
shipping lobby managed to strike out a clause billing the costs of transportation of rejected 
and ejected migrants to the companies; in 1891 the clause was adopted over their 
objections. Congress also billed the shippers for the maintenance costs of all passengers 
detained at the control stations. The transatlantic transportation cost, balancing at around 
$10, kept this financial burden relatively low. What really cut into shipping companies' 
profits were the hospital bills for migrants with "loathsome and contagious" diseases, at 
daily rates between $1 and $3, depending on the illness. This class of immigrants was 
added to the excluded list in 1891 and gradually expanded to exclude polygamists, 
anarchists, prostitutes, procurers, the insane, and epileptics. In particular, favus and 
trachoma (skin and eye infections, respectively) inflated medical bills. Shipping 
companies tried to recuperate these expenses from passengers or their families, though 
with limited success. The companies tried to ship these cases back immediately, yet 
immigrant authorities sometimes deferred deportations, to swell the bills as a penalty for 
bringing them over. This practice was formalized into a 1903 law empowering immigrant 
authorities to fine shipping lines $100 for bringing passengers with contagious diseases 
that should have been detected before departure. The number of ejected migrants also 
swelled as the period of deportability extended for arriving passengers falling under one of 
the excluded categories. If deportees came from remote places, the cost of rail transport to 
the port could weigh especially heavily.49 These measures had repercussions well beyond 
America's gates, as shipping companies hired extra doctors (including dermatologists and 
ophthalmologists) to screen passengers before leaving Europe. The Dillingham 
Commission noted that more migrants were being refused for medical reasons in Europe 
than in the U.S. This combined success of "remoting" and "commercializing" border 
control culminated in the Quota Acts (1920s), which put numerical limitations on 
European migration by nationality, based on census data. As the quotas were adopted with 
little consideration for enforcement, the Immigration Bureau left the issue to the shipping 
companies, which risked fines for bringing over excess passengers. Through the shipping 
cartels, the companies set up an information system to keep track of the immigrant quotas 
per nationality before departure, limiting the excess passengers to a minimum.50 
     Yet shipping companies did not passively undergo the imposition of increased 
responsibilities: they often challenged new measures in court. Test cases, financed jointly 
by all cartel members, sometimes forced the U.S. immigration authorities to revoke 
measures. More than immigrants themselves, the main forces contesting border restrictions 
were the shipping companies bringing in immigrants. But while restrictions on 
immigration cut into the shipping companies' profits, they also created business 
opportunities. For instance, restrictions boosted the transatlantic second-class service. This 
class cost between 25% and 50% more than third class and targeted better-off migrants 
and budget travelers. Second-class passengers were initially absolved from passing 
through border-control stations. In 1903 they were subjected to a very superficial onboard 
screening, in which rejection rates were one tenth those for third class. The Immigration 
Bureau repeatedly denounced this back door, which remained open until World War I, 
mainly thanks to the shipping lobby. In some cases shipping lines stimulated the passage 
of second class by giving fare reductions to certain excluded groups, such as Mormons. 
Shipping lines also assisted third-class passengers. The screenings at the ports before 
departure were designed not so much to send back excludables as to increase their chances 
of getting through border controls. The sick were held in observation to be cured. The 
incurable chose other destinations, alternative routes, or returned home.51 
     On the ship, the purser managed the passenger manifests to track down excludables. He 
screened the answers and adapted those that might raise suspicions. For instance, groups 
of single men having the same final destination would be subject to suspicion as being 
contract labourers. Shipping personnel coached these passengers on how to pass controls. 
Some companies hired translators to prepare passengers on board for inspections. Before 
arrival, all passengers were encouraged to wash up, to make the best possible impression 
on inspectors. Names of passengers showing potential risks for being detained were 
telegrammed to New York for special assistance upon arrival. Relatives and friends were 
tracked down to send money, post bond, or appear before the immigration authorities to 
facilitate entry of the travelers. The shipping lines followed these cases, providing support 
to appeal decisions to reject. If relatives or friends could not be traced, shipping companies 
contacted charity associations to assist detainees. To generate good will among 
immigration inspectors, the shipping lines sometimes gave them gifts, reduced or free 
ocean passages. All these efforts were made while balancing the fine line of maintaining 
good working relationships with the Immigration Bureau. Opposing interests often placed 
shippers and inspectors at odds, but the interdependence of their operations created a 
sound working relationship between them. Thus, fines for violations were more often 
waived than collected.52 
     Shipping companies stayed true to their first nature as carriers of human mobility 
rather than barriers, sometimes even beyond their own will: stowaways were a growing 
phenomenon in the early twentieth century. Others bypassed immigration controls by 
taking jobs as cattlemen or sailors on ships and deserting upon arrival. This was also a 
notably cheaper way to migrate. Some groups, such as the Norwegians traveling to 
Brooklyn, even used this relocation strategy structurally—crossing as seamen, then 
deserting to settle in the U.S. without passing through immigrant inspection. Not before 
1917 did the Immigration Bureau obtain any authority to intervene in the landing of 
seamen.  
     Efforts of the American immigration administration to close back doors ran into 
constant difficulties. Its own measures often created loopholes to get in. For instance, the 
imposition of all kinds of documentation to facilitate the distinction between citizens and 
aliens created opportunities for undesirable migrants to travel on American passports or 
falsify them. The addition of a naturalization department to the Immigration Bureau in 
1906, to standardize the fragmentized state procedures, did not put an end to this practice. 
This brings us back to the Pacific where the use of personal documentation to distinguish 
desirable from undesirable Chinese travelers was pioneered. This documentation instantly 
became a valuable commodity and counterfeit or altered documents quickly circulated. A 
common path for illicit entry was by buying a legitimate entry permit held by a U.S. 
resident retiring and returning to China. Also part of this phenomenon were the "paper 
sons," referring to those who fabricated familial identities to take advantage of the 
loophole allowing immediate family members of Chinese merchants to immigrate. 
Photographs introduced as objective evidence were quickly altered or substituted by illegal 
entrants to construct false identities, further undermining the value of paper documents as 
evidence.53 
     The distinctive nature of the Pacific border regime created different means of 
contesting it. For instance, cabin-class travel was not an option for Chinese migrants, as 
they were scrutinized much more thoroughly on the Pacific. Second-class passengers 
encountered even higher deportation rates than the so-called Chinese steerage-class 
migrants. Deportation averaged about 10% of the arrivals on the Pacific, as compared with 
1% on the Atlantic. To contest rejections, Chinese appealed their cases in court—a right 
denied to Europeans under the general immigration laws, which limited appeals within the 
immigration administration. Courts allowed 90 percent of the Chinese appellants to 
reverse the decision to reject. The Supreme Court started closing this loophole around the 
turn of the century. By then, the Chinese Bureau had started to deport Chinese under 
general immigration laws, in order to avoid long court procedures. Some strategies of 
contesting borders on the Pacific were similar than those on the Atlantic. Stowaways made 
their way illegally, even though ships coming from China faced very strict controls. The 
loophole of desertion by seamen, still neglected by scholars, is of interest because Chinese 
seamen were a cheap and popular workforce on ships plying the Pacific and beyond. 
Chinese crews were monitored closely by the authorities, for instance by imposition of 
bonds to be paid by Chinese seamen seeking the right to land and change ships. The 
system was far from waterproof, however: it was open to change of identity among other 
Chinese looking for a trip back home. The administrative energy and resources expended 
on limiting Asian illegal migration enabled larger numbers of back-door entries for 
Europeans.54 
Conclusion 
To enable a more complete comparison of Atlantic and Pacific migration, this research in 
progress needs more archival research to fully uncover how shipping companies 
positioned themselves between the migrant and the state for the Pacific. Research on the 
Atlantic provides a solid base to work from and will shed new light on this dual border 
regime. Here also further research, in particular in the richly preserved immigration 
records of the U.S. National Archives, can provide more information on the experience of 
these immigration control stations. How much did these stations respond to local 
situations? To what extent were they in contact with each other directly or indirectly 
through the central administration? How much did the alleged rhetoric and gatekeeping 
measures to exclude Chinese really transfer nationally and globally to exclude all migrants 
nationwide on the ground, thus creating a frontier consolidating a certain world order? 
Should we really envision U.S. border enforcement as a linear demarcation with transfers 
of restrictionist rhetoric and gatekeeping tools mainly from west to east or rather as 
isolated dots with limited connections in both directions at best? This article suggests the 
latter and calls for more research that localizes the roots of the modern-day border 
enforcement system to uncover how it spread globally, consolidating the frontiers and 
increasing gaps between the core and periphery. National frameworks remain central in 
this process, as regulating human mobility became one of the catalysts to confirm national 
sovereignty of the emerging nation states. Early migration policies were often more 
concerned with how people moved than who migrated. As this article emphasizes, the 
commercial interests behind mass transoceanic migration remain very much overlooked in 
both migration and maritime history.  
     This article places the transport companies at the heart of global mobility, where they 
naturally belong. It calls for interposing these third parties into the often-narrow view 
treating migration legislation and enforcement as a dual dynamic, limited to the migrant 
and the state. Transport companies helped shape the directions and volume of global, mass 
migration and played a central role in the enactment, enforcement, and evasion of 
migration policies. The Atlantic shipping lobby successfully opposed such U.S. 
immigration restrictions as the literacy test, even as the American authorities gradually 
integrated shipping companies into the mechanism to exclude undesirables. While to some 
extent American authorities converted these carriers into barriers to human mobility, in 
particular for unhealthy migrants, shipping lines stayed true to their nature by turning 
restrictions into business opportunities, stimulating migratory flows through back doors 
via Cuba, Canada and Mexico. As Peter Andreas argues, however, most smuggling 
activities paralleled the routes and methods of legal commerce, as illustrated by passenger 
use of second cabin class to dodge immigrant inspections. Government officials 
understood that measures to stimulate the legal flow of goods and people unintentionally 
spurred smuggling while, at the same time, strict measures to crack down on illicit traffic 
obstructed the legal flows.55 Exclusion of undesired migrants not only affected the entry of 
desired migrants, but also of tourists, diplomats, businessmen, and even of goods 
transported on the same routes. Throughout the period discussed here, therefore, the 
American authorities showed reluctance to implement harsh restrictive measures, moreso 
on the Atlantic than the Pacific, and thus created many opportunities for illegal entry. 
Legal and illegal mobility clustered around nodal transport points, such as New York and 
San Francisco, where modern border and frontier zones arose. These transport nodes 
represent very useful foci of analysis for world historians, as places of interaction among 
and within scales, social spaces, and social systems. Focusing on such nodes in connection 
with outlying control stations will give new insights on how frontiers take form and shift 
and place some question marks on the militarization of borders.  
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